Syria One Year Later: Mapping Recovery Paths

After fourteen years of war and the toppling of the Assad regime on December, 8th 2024, Syria faces an unparalleled reconstruction task. One third of the country’s capital stock is damaged or destroyed, and the estimated rebuilding bill accumulated to hundreds of billions of dollars. The World Bank’s “best estimate” is about $216 billion  (roughly ten times of Syria’s 2024 GDP), while other assessments put it as high as $250–400 billion. Syria’s economy has contracted sharply; real GDP fell by over half during the conflict, and poverty has surged (one UNDP estimate finds 90% of Syrians living in poverty today ). Currency collapse and inflation have compounded the crisis: the pound lost about 80–90% of its value, leaving central bank reserves near depletion. This macroeconomic collapse sets the stage for Syria’s post-Assad transition. Restoration will demand simultaneous efforts on many fronts: rebuilding effective institutions and governance, stabilizing the macroeconomy and finance, repairing infrastructure and key sectors (agriculture, energy, industry), and reining in the informal “war economy.” Each of these areas poses its own hurdles, from widespread corruption and legal uncertainty to donor fatigue and lingering security risks, which I will talk about below, so tighten your seatbelt please. 

Rebuilding Institutions and Governance 

The collapse of Assad’s centralized authority left a huge institutional vacuum. Establishing legitimate, inclusive governance is a first-order priority. Syria’s transitional authorities must form a new government, enact a constitution, and unify fragmented armed factions under civilian control. Analysts stress that this success depends on building “inclusive, legitimate institutions” from the ground up. An attempt to do that was Syria’s 2025 Constitutional Declaration, which empowers a transitional president and legislature, but governance experts warn that checks and balances will be crucial to prevent a return of authoritarianism through new faces and similar governance frameworks. Efforts are also underway to integrate fighters into a national army and police force, but lingering mistrust towards major figures in government and regional influences complicate the process. Security sector reform must accompany political reforms: disarming militias and prosecuting war criminals will be needed to restore the rule of law. Western donors, including the European Union, have made this clear by tying aid to governance benchmarks. Foreign assistance and investment will likely be conditional on democratic reforms, transparency, and accountability. Only by curbing patronage networks and granting real power to properly elected representative bodies can Syria create a stable environment for reconstruction and avoid a relapse into conflict as we have seen in the Coast and Suwayda. 

Macroeconomic Stabilization and Financial Reform

Reestablishing economic stability is another urgent challenge. During the war, Syria’s public finances collapsed—specifically oil and tax revenues—crashed out, budgets were obliterated, and the banking system fragmented. The pound’s freefall has driven hyperinflation and food-price shocks. By one report, the currency depreciated 141% in 2023, helping trigger triple-digit inflation and making basic goods unaffordable. Al Jazeera noted that by late 2024 the central bank held only about $200 million in foreign reserves (down from ~$17 billion in 2010). Such figures underscore the scale of fiscal and monetary disarray. Stabilization will require strong policy measures. The new authorities will likely need to reform fiscal policy (rationalizing subsidies and reforming taxes) and strengthen the central bank’s credibility. Narrowing the deficit and taming inflation will also hinge on restarting domestic production. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs), once 95% of Syrian businesses and 60% of its GDP, have been particularly hard hit. 

Supporting these SMEs is critical: they still provide about 70% of employment and are a buffer against poverty. At the same time, the government must try to formalize the pervasive informal economy. During the war, a parallel black market emerged to fill gaps in goods and services left by the torn-apart state. By 2021, for instance, the pound was changing hands at an 82-fold rate on the black market compared to pre-war, and about 140% inflation (2019–2020) undermined tax collection. Rebuilding confidence in Syria’s financial system by reforming banking regulations and ensuring secure remittances will be essential to broaden the revenue base and attract investment. In short, macroeconomic recovery is an equally critical task. Getting growth back on track (current growth is only ~1% annually) will require boosting productivity. The UNDP finds that achieving pre-war GDP in 15 years would need roughly 5–14% annual growth, far above current rates after a year of Assad’s escape to Moscow on December 8th. In practice achieving this level of growth means jump-starting exports, reviving industry, and integrating Syria into regional trade, all while keeping inflation in check. 

Infrastructure Reconstruction and Sector Revitalization 

The war left Syria’s infrastructure in ruins. On-the-ground surveys show that roads, bridges, power lines, water systems, schools, and hospitals have been extensively damaged, especially in former conflict zones (Aleppo, Homs, Raqqa). For example, one assessment reports that almost one third of all housing units were destroyed or severely damaged by 2022, and over 40% of health centers and sewage systems are out of service. Energy capacity also collapsed: well over 70% of power plants and lines were damaged, cutting national electricity output by about 80%. Restoring electricity and water is therefore a priority not just for daily life but for businesses and healthcare. Economic sectors need similar revitalization. Agriculture, historically crucial for food security within Syria’s context, suffered from broken irrigation, land mines in fields, and displaced farm workers. Meanwhile, manufacturing and construction have almost disappeared in many provinces. In the oil and gas sector (which once generated key revenue), production plunged from roughly 380,000 barrels per day in 2010 to only about 90,000 by 2023. Urban centres still bear the marks of bombardment: banks of rubble line city streets. Infrastructure programs will thus need to be enormous. 

Formalizing the Economy and Attracting Investment 

Years of war gave rise to a sprawling war economy of black-market trade and militia-controlled resources. Armed groups and former regime networks profited by smuggling fuel and goods, extorting protection fees, and grabbing land. Analysts warn that elements of this wartime economy will persist into the recovery phase . For instance, rubble-clearance and import routes may remain in the hands of local power brokers unless the state reasserts control, which might not be feasible in SDF-controlled areas and Druze-governed Suwayda. Transitioning to a peacetime economy will thus require a deliberate effort to dismantle these networks and integrate fighters into civilian life or into organized security forces. Any broad demobilization or employment program must be tied to cutting off these shadow incomes. Even as Syria tries to formalize its economy, attracting foreign capital is essential but difficult. Investors face numerous hurdles: the legal system is still unsettled because of the lack of a unified constitutional framework, as agreed upon by all Syrians. Property registries were largely destroyed or manipulated, and many businesses were confiscated during the war. As a result, rule-of-law remains weak and property rights are unclear. Destroyed land registries and the lack of dispute resolution mechanisms make large-scale foreign investment unlikely in the near term. In practice, this means only small short-term loans or joint ventures are likely unless reforms improve transparency and contracts. Meanwhile, external funding and investment pledges have been substantial on paper but challenging in practice. At the Brussels donor conference in March 2025, international donors promised about €5.8 billion for Syrian recovery. But analysts caution that actual delivery of aid may lag, given security concerns and administrative bottlenecks regarding the new government’s actions. All this suggests donor fatigue and competing global crises limit the pool of available aid. Corruption compounds these problems. With weak oversight and many interests at play, there is a risk that reconstruction contracts could be awarded to politically connected firms, or that aid funds could be siphoned off. Any resurgence of nepotism would undermine public trust and deter foreign businesses. Overcoming these challenges will require both domestic reform (for example, establishing independent anti-corruption bodies and open procurement) and international guarantees (such as conditional finance from trusted institutions). Without legal clarity and political buy-in, investment and recovery will stall. 

Conclusion 

Syria’s post-Assad recovery demands an integrated PLURALISTIC approach. The scale of need is gigantic, from shattered institutions to shattered factories. In practical terms, this means aligning diplomatic engagement, donor aid, and Syrian reform around common goals: transparent governance, macroeconomic stability, and social development. Syria’s path “from rubble to reform” will be long and complex, but careful sequencing of reforms and strong international coordination can lay the foundation for a more resilient economy. Syria can rebuild not only its infrastructure, but the institutions and economic fabric needed for lasting peace and prosperity, which is the very least Syrians deserve after all their suffering.